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Abstract
Edward Chamberlin conjectured that the number of trades in realistic trad-
ing systems is likely to exceed that predicted by competitive equilibrium the-
ory. He supported this conjecture by data from a large number of classroom
experiments and with a plausible argument based on a numerical example.
This paper states and proves a theorem that supports and illuminates Cham-
berlin’s intuition, supplies examples of trading processes that lead to excess
trading, and presents some additional experimental evidence.Experimental Markets and Chamberlin’s
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there is no recontracting, the number of transactions is likely to exceed the
number predicted by competitive equilibrium theory. Chamberlin conducted
a series of classroom market experiments in which he induced market demand
and supply by assigning each student a role either as a demander with a
speciﬁed buyer value or a supplier with a speciﬁed seller cost. Chamberlin
reports that in forty-six classroom market experiments, the number of trades
exceeded the competitive equilibrium quantity forty-two times and was never
smaller.
Chamberlin showed a numerical example in which partially informed
traders make some trades at non-equilibrium prices and where the number
of trades is greater than that found in competitive equilibrium. On the basis
of this example and his experimental results, Chamberlin stated that:
“The conclusion seems unavoidable that ‘price ﬂuctuations
render the volume of sales normally greater than the equilibrium
amount which is indicated by the supply and demand curves.’”
Chamberlin does not oﬀer a formal proof of his assertion, nor does he
spell out precise conditions under which the assertion is true. This paper
supplies a theorem that conﬁrms Chamberlin’s intuition. Stated informally,
our theorem asserts that if traders are suﬃciently aggressive to ﬁnd mutually
proﬁtable trade possibilities so long as they exist, then the number of trades
must be at least as large as the competitive equilibrium quantity.
Let us deﬁne a simple trading economy to be one in which there are
suppliers and demanders. Each supplier i has a speciﬁed seller cost ci at
which she can supply at most one unit. Each demander j has a speciﬁed
buyer value vj. If supplier i sells a unit to demander j at price p, then
supplier i has a proﬁt of p − ci and demander j has a proﬁt of vj − p.
Let us deﬁne a trading outcome as a list of all buyer-seller pairs who trade
1and the price at which each pair trades. We say that a trading outcome is
exhaustive if no demander who did not trade and no supplier who did not
trade in this outcome could trade with each other at a price which is proﬁtable
for both.
Theorem 1 A competitive equilibrium is an exhaustive trading outcome. If
a simple trading economy has a unique competitive equilibrium quantity, the
number of trades in any exhaustive trading outcome is at least as large as the
number of trades in competitive equilibrium.
On the way to proving Theorem 1, we establish the following lemma.
Lemma 1 If competitive equilibrium has a unique trading quantity, then it
must be that in competitive equilibrium the buyer value of every buyer who
trades exceeds the seller cost of every seller who trades.1
Proof of Lemma 1:
Consider a competitive equilibrium with price p. Since traders have the
option of not trading, no buyer or seller makes a negative proﬁt. Therefore
every demander who trades has a buyer value at least as high as p and every
supplier who trades has a seller cost no higher than p. It follows that if
supplier i and buyer j trade in competitive equilibrium then bj ≥ p ≥ vi.
Suppose that bj = p = ci. Then, since both i and j make zero proﬁt in equi-
librium, there exists another competitive equilibrium with the same price p
but with a smaller number of trades. In this alternative equilibrium i and
j do not trade and all other traders who traded in the original competi-
tive equilibrium continue to trade. Therefore if the competitive equilibrium
1Notice that Lemma 1 does not state that if competitive equilibrium quantity is unique,
all traders must make positive proﬁts. It might be that some traders on one side of the
market make zero proﬁts, but if so then all traders on the other side of the market make
positive proﬁts.
2quantity is unique, and supplier i and demander j both trade in competitive
equilibrium, it must be that bi > vj. QED
With Lemma 1 in hand, the proof of Theorem 1 is easy.
Proof of Theorem 1:
First we show that a competitive equilibrium outcome is exhaustive. Let
p be a competitive equilibrium price. In a simple trading economy, supplier
i with will trade if p > ci and will not trade if p < ci. Demander j will
trade if p < vj and will not trade if p > vj. If demander i does not trade
in competitive equilibrium, then vi ≤ p, where vi. Therefore if neither buyer
i nor seller j makes a trade in competitive equilibrium, it must be that
bi ≤ cj. But this implies that i and j could not trade together at a price that
is proﬁtable for both. It follows that competitive equilibrium is an exhaustive
trading outcome.
Consider a trading outcome with fewer trades than there are in compet-
itive equilibrium. It must be that there is at least one demander i and at
least one supplier j who does not trade in this trading outcome, but does
trade in competitive equilibrium. From Lemma 1 it follows bi > cj. But if
this is the case, the proposed trading outcome is not exhaustive. QED
Theorem 1 tells us that if traders understand their buyer values and
seller costs and are suﬃciently aggressive to ﬁnd mutually proﬁtable trade
possibilities so long as such remain, then the number of trades will be at least
as large as the competitive equilibrium quantity.
Exhaustive and Voluntary Trading Outcomes
It is not remarkable that some trading outcomes have more trades than the
competitive outcome. Additional trades can always be forced if one party
is coerced to trade. The interesting thing that Chamberlin observed is that
there are trading outcomes where the number of trades is greater than the
3trading outcome and where all traders make non-negative proﬁts.
Let us deﬁne a trade to be voluntary if both proﬁts of both the buyer
and the seller are non-negative. In a simple trading economy, competitive
equilibrium is voluntary, since traders choose to trade only if they make a non-
negative proﬁt. The following remark shows given a very weak restriction,
a simple trading economy will have voluntary trading outcomes with more
trade than a competitive equilibrium.
Remark 1 In a simple trading economy, there will exist a voluntary trading
outcome with more trades than in competitive equilibrium unless either (i) the
seller cost of all suppliers who do not trade exceeds the highest buyer value
or (ii) the buyer value of all demanders who do not trade is smaller than the
lowest seller cost.
Proof of Remark 1 Suppose that Conditions (i) and (ii) of the remark are
not satisﬁed and consider a competitive equilibrium at price p. Then there is
a supplier i whose seller cost is less than the buyer value of some demander
j∗ who does not trade in competitive equilibrium, and there is a demander
j whose buyer value is greater than the seller cost of some supplier i∗ who
does not trade. Consider the trading outcome in which all traders other
than supplier i and demander j continue to trade at the price p, but supplier
i trades with demander j∗ at a price between ci and bj∗ and demander j
trades with demander i∗ at a price between ci∗ and bj. This trading outcome
is voluntary and there is one more trade in this trading outcome than in
competitive equilibrium. QED
An Example
To illustrate these ideas, it is helpful to consider an example. Here we con-
sider a distribution of buyer values and seller costs taken from the experi-
ments studied by Bergstrom and Kwok [1]. The market has 16 “low-cost”
4suppliers, each of whom can supply one unit at a cost of $10 and 8 “high-
cost” suppliers, each of whom can supply one unit at a cost of $30. There
are also 16 “low-value” demanders, each of whom has a buyer value of $20
for a single unit and 8 “high-value” demanders, each of whom has a buyer
value of $40. The demand and supply curves for this economy are shown in
Figure 1.
Figure 1: Supply and Demand in Session 1
We see from Figure 1 that there is a unique competitive equilibrium at
the competitive price $20 and the competitive quantity 16 units.
Suppose that a matchmaker controlled the pairings for this trading econ-
omy and only allowed the 8 high-value demanders to meet the 8 high-cost
sellers and the 16 low-value demanders to meet the 16 low-cost sellers. The
high-value, high-cost pairings could make mutually proﬁtable trades at a
price of $35 and the low-value, low-cost pairings could make mutually prof-
itable trades at a price of $15. This trading outcome is voluntary, since
every trader makes a positive proﬁt, and the total number of trades is 24 as
compared to only 16 trades in competitive equilibrium.
Another interesting trading process with a voluntary and exhaustive trad-
ing outcome is the following. In the ﬁrst round of trading, demanders and
suppliers are randomly paired. If the buyer value of the demander exceeds
5the seller cost of the supplier with whom he is paired, they transact at a
price intermediate between the buyer value and seller cost. Those pairs who
can not make a trade join a pool of unmatched individuals. This proce-
dure is iterated on the pool of unmatched individuals until there are no two
unmatched individuals who can make a mutually proﬁtable exchange.
Let us apply this process to the Bergstrom-Kwok example described
above. In the ﬁrst round, all low-cost suppliers will trade with whoever
they meet, since a seller cost of $10 is lower than the buyer value of any
demander. Likewise all high-value demanders will trade in the ﬁrst round,
since a buyer value of $30 exceeds the seller cost of every supplier. There-
fore the only traders left after the ﬁrst round are high-cost suppliers and
low-value demanders, who can not make a mutually proﬁtable trade. Thus
the trading process ends after a single round. The number of trades that
result is a random variable, which is determined by the random matching of
suppliers and demanders in the ﬁrst round. The total number of trades must
equal the total number of suppliers who trade. The 16 low-cost suppliers will
certainly trade. Of the 8 high-cost suppliers, those who meet high-value de-
manders will trade. The number of high-cost suppliers who trade is therefore
a random variable X with a hypergeometric distribution determined by the
number of high-value buyers who are drawn in 8 draws, with replacement,
from a population of 8 high-value and 16 low-value demanders. The number
of trades will exceed the competitive number whenever at least one high-cost
supplier is paired with a high-value demander. The probability that this
happens is greater than 0.98.2
2The maximum likelihood outcome is 19 trades, which happens with a probability of
about 1/3.
6Extension to More General Economies
In a simple trading economy, as we have deﬁned it, each trader can buy or
sell at most one unit. The result of Theorem 1 extends, using essentially the
same proof, to economies of the following kind.
Suppliers and demanders both seek to maximize proﬁts as follows. For
each supplier i there is a cost function ci(n) such that her proﬁts if she sells
n units and receives a total payment of $P are P − ci(n). For each buyer j
there is a value function bj(n) such that his proﬁts if he pays a total of $P
for n units are bj(n) − P.
This class of economies encompasses economies where suppliers satisfy the
standard economic theory of the ﬁrm. The assumption about demanders is
satisﬁed in a market where consumers seek to maximize quasi-linear utilities,
but does not apply to commodities for which there are “income eﬀects” on
demand.
Empirical Conﬁrmation
Bergstrom and Kwok [1] examined the results in 31 separate classrooms
in which, two rounds of two separate classroom market experiments were
conducted.3 Figure 2 shows the frequency of excess trading across these
classrooms.
Like Chamberlin, we found that the number of trades frequently exceeded
that in competitive equilibrium. But we also found that in more than 1/3 of
the sessions in which traders had some experience, the number of trades was
3In both of these experiments there were two types of buyers and two types of sellers.
In the ﬁrst of these experiments, the distributions of supplier and demanders were in the
same proportions shown in Figure 1. In the second of these experiments, the types were
the same, but the proportions of low and high-cost suppliers were reversed as were the
proportions of low and high-value demanders.
7Figure 2: Excess Trading in the Classroom
equal to the competitive prediction. Unlike Chamberlin, we observed a few
classrooms in which the number of trades fell short of that in competitive
equilibrium. From Theorem 1, we conclude that in these classrooms, there
were some suppliers and some demanders who did not trade, but could have
made a proﬁt if they had found each other before trading ended.
In his paper, Chamberlin reveals a detail of his procedure that appears
to explain why he never observed fewer than the competitive number of
trade. In a footnote, Chamberlin explains that he forced the execution of
any mutually proﬁtable trades that remained unconsummated during regular
8trading.4 Chamberlin’s procedure guarantees that the trading process is in
our terms, “exhaustive.” Theorem 1 tells us that in a simple trading economy
the number of trades resulting from an exhaustive trading process can not
be smaller than the number of trades in competitive equilibrium.
4Chamberlin’s footnote reads as follows:
In perhaps four or ﬁve cases out of the forty-six it was discovered ... that
a single transaction which could have been made had not been made. In
other words, the highest remaining buyer’s ticket was higher than the lowest
remaining seller’s ticket. In each of these cases the bargain was ruled as
having been made at the midpoint between the two ﬁgures. This procedure
was justiﬁed on the ground that, since there was pressure for time, the buyer
and seller would, in fact, have found each other if the market had lasted
longer.
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